Civil Procedure—Capacity of Incompetent to Sue by Buffalo Law Review
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 8 Number 1 Article 18 
10-1-1958 
Civil Procedure—Capacity of Incompetent to Sue 
Buffalo Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Buffalo Law Review, Civil Procedure—Capacity of Incompetent to Sue, 8 Buff. L. Rev. 60 (1958). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol8/iss1/18 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Agent's Inuring Immunities
The Court of Appeals in Berger v. 34th Street Garage, Inc.' reaffirmed the
rule olkwing for the extension of a principal's non-personal immunities to his
agent." Where an expressman'- liability is limited and he stores his truck and
contents overnight in a garage, with the shipper's knowledge and consent, the
garageman may enjoy the same limited liability.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Capacity of Incompetent to Sue
In Sengstack '. Sengstack, a suit for legal separation between New York
residents, plaintiff wife alleged her own mental incompetence in anticipation of
her husband's defense of abandonment. She had had a long history of mental
disorders and treatment when in 1952 she left her husband's abode in New York
and went to live in Minneapolis with a son. In 1953, a Minnesota probate court
appointed her son as general guardian over her estate and person after having
received her signed application alleging her own incompetence. A guardian ad
litem brought a suit for separation shortly thereafter but her husband successfully
defended on the ground that she had to bring it in person as there had been no
adjudication of incompetency and therefore the court was without power to
appoint a guardian ad litem. This was not appealed.
This suit was commenced in her own name by attorney. The trial court
upheld her capacity to sue and also appointed a special guardian to look into the
facts of the situation and make recommendations for the protection of her
interests. 2 The Appellate Division-" affirmed as did the Court of Appeals,4 despite
the arguments of the husband that she had no capacity to sue and that the trial
court had no power to appoint a special guardian in this case.
The Court of Appeals took the view that the Minnesota decree was not
binding upon New York courts inasmuch as plaintiff was a resident of New York
and there had been no actual adjudication of incompetence, the order having
been issued ex parte. In effect, this establishes a converse rule to In re Curiss5
10. 3 N.Y.2d 701, 171 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1958).
11. RESTATEMENT, SECOND, AGENCY §347; Schoeffer v. United Parcel Service
of New York, 277 App. Div. 569, 101 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1st Dep't 1950).
1. 4 N.Y.2d 502, 176 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1958).
2. 7 Misc.2d 1012, 166 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup.Ct. 1957).
3. 4 A.D.2d 1035, 169 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1st Dep't 1957).
4. Supra note 1.
5. In re Curtiss, 134 App.Div. 547, 119 N.Y.Supp. 556 (1st Dep't 1909), aff'd,
197 N.Y. 583, 91 N.E. 1111 (1910).
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where it was held that New York will give full faith and credit to a decree of
incompetency issued by a sister state where the subject of the decree was a
resident of that state.
Section 236 of the Civil Practice Act provides that a person who is of full
age may prosecute or defend a civil action in person or by attorney unless he has
been judically declared incompetent to manage his own affairs.6 It is settled law in
New York that until a court imposes its jurisdiction to declare a person mentally
incompetent, the legal status of such person is not changed and he may sue or be
sued in the same manner as anyone else.7 However, the question as to whether
a litigant may actually allege his own incompetence and successfully sue in his own
name, had never been directly decided in New York. The nearest approach to this
situation arose in In re Palestine's Estate8 where an administratrix was sued by an
alleged creditor of the estate. There she alleged her own mental incompetence, but
the suit was nevertheless maintained, the Surrogate's Court appointing a special
guardian to look after her interests as administratrix. The court relied upon section
236 of the Civil Practice Act as interpreted by William v. Empire Woolen Co.9
which declared that a person may sue or be sued regardless of incompetency so
long as there was no judicial declaration of it.
In affirming the right of Mrs. Sengstack to sue, the Court of Appeals gives
weight to the reasonableness of it under the circumstances of this case. There is
affirmative authority for it in section 236 and no statutory prohibition. In addition,
the attitude of her husband showed that she had need of the court's protection
in as much as he had been playing a dilatory game both in court and out. The
same reasoning applies to the appointment of a special guardian. Any incompetent,
whether judicially declared so or not, is a ward of the court and is owed by it a
duty of protection.' 0 Section 207 of the Civil Practice Act" permits the appoint-
ment of a special guardian for an incompetent at any stage of the proceeding
when considered by the court to be necessary for the protection of the interests
of the incompetent. There is no express requirement that the incompetent be
judicially declared so. In the light of the circumstances of this case, it seems
reasonable to appoint such a guardian at this stage of the proceeding rather than
delay things by requiring that a committee be appointed and plaintiff be judicially
declared incompetent under Article 81 of the Civil Practice Act.'2 Such a require-
ment would merely aid the dilatory tactics of the husband. In its decision here,
6. N. Y. Civ. PnAc. Aer §236.
7. Williams v. Empire Woolen Co., 7 App. Div. 345, 39 N.Y. Supp. 941 (4th
Dep't 1896); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 3 A.D.2d 590,,162 N.Y.S.2d 984 (2d
Dep't 1957); In re Palestine's Estate, 151 Misc. 100, 270 N.Y.Supp. 844 (Surr. Ct.
1934).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Wurster v. Armfeld, 175 N.Y. 265, 67 N.E. 584 (1903).
11. N. Y. CIv. PRac. Acr §207.
12. N. Y. CIv. PRAc. Acr Article 81.
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the Court of Appeals does nor say that any incompetent who has not been
judicially declared so may successfully sue while alleging his own incompetence.
The holding merely permits a trial court, in its discretion, to permit such a person
to g- forward with an action, if it appears that under the circumstances of that
particular case the interests of the incompetent would be better protected than by
requiring the appointment of a committee and a judicial declaration of
incompetency.
Res Judicata--Judgment for Defendant on Non-appearance of Plaintiff no Bar
to Subsequent Action
The defendant, in Greenberg v. DeHart, 13 made a motion to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Rule 107 of the Rules of Civil Practice. Prior to the
commencement of the present action, the Greenbergs had asserted the same
causes of action against DeHart in an action commenced in King's County. This
action was consolidated with an action to recover damages for injury to property
commenced by DeHart, since both actions arose out of the same automobile
collision. When the consolidated action came up for trial, the Greenbergs did
not appear. At this point in the proceedings, the claim asserted by DeHart had
been settled and there remained to be tried only the issues in the Greenbergs'
personal injury action. The attorney for defendant appeared and waived a jury
trial and the court proceeded to take evidence from defendant's witnesses. At the
close of the evidence, the trial court granted *defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint on the merits and judgment of that effect was entered. It is this
judgment, purportedly rendered on the merits, that constituted the basis of
defendant's motion to dismiss in the present action. The Court held that the
doctrine of res judicata did not apply and accordingly reinstated the order of the
special term denying the defendant's motion to dismiss in the present action.
A judgment must be rendered upon the merits if it is to be used as an
estoppel to the prosecution of subsequent action.14 The effectiveness of the
adjudication will depend, not on its form, but on the nature of the proceedings in
which it was made.' 5 After a careful analysis of the proceedings, the Court
concluded that the judgment relied on by DeHart as a bar to the present action
was no more than a noasuit.16 A recital in the judgment that it is upon the
merits lends no efficacy to it for purposes of res judicata. But the defendant
alleged that the lower court authoritatively rendered a judgment on the merits
pursuant to section 494-a of the Civil Practice Act which provides for the
13. 4 N.Y.2d 511, 176 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1958).
14. Rudd v. Cornell, 171 N.Y. 114, 63 N.E. 823 (1902).
15. Bannon v. Bannon, 270 N.Y. 484, 1 N.E.2d 975 (1936); but 3ee Ziegler v.
International Railway Co., 232 App. Div. 43, 248 N.Y.Supp. 375 (4th Dep't 1931).
16. See Honsinger v. Union Carriage & Gear Co., 175 N.Y. 229, 67 N.E. 436
(1903).
